The IRGC Is Weakened, but the Iranian People Still Won't Revolt, Says Major-General

Transcript

Well, it's looking like a hereditary monarchy now, which is what the original Ayatollah was campaigning against. What's the relationship between the people and the IRGC? Now, obviously, you've got a a Shia population, which is like 24%. Is the IRGC viewed as legitimate by a a significant portion of the population or is it viewed as like an oppressor? What's the what's actually the view on the ground? >> Yeah, it it's an acceptance that it is present. It is an oppressor. Um the challen I have a brother-in-law who's Iranian, so he's my source. He's a great source. He says the challenge with the Persians is that very modern society.

Look, they invented math, right? Just talk to my brother-in-law. He would tell you they invented math. I call my brother-in-law Xerxes and he loves that. um the uh so you know you've got this very modern society that over the course of 50 years it's now become part of their DNA. I mean they're very submissive and as he describes it he says we're a very proud people but we're not prepared to sacrifice that you know they they've accepted so much they've been this is a bunch of body blows over the course of years. Um, and it's very difficult for them to think that there might be some type of possible alternative out there. There could be, as I described, there could be a possibility here, but the IRGC is

immensely weakened, but it still exists. It's a control mechanism internally. They're not going to export this. Um, that becomes the major problem. So, are the Iranian people, 93 million folks, are they prepared to make some type of a an an aggressive and the reason we did this now is we thought they were in a position to make kind of an aggressive sustained move. I mean, we had an opportunity. We took it. We decapitated the regime. We did it because we had incredible weapon systems. As Chris indicated, maritime air campaign unprecedented. It's absolutely phenomenal. Uh but we saw the unrest over the course of the last six weeks, two months, and we thought maybe something's here. Let's Oh, and we now have an opportunity. Let's see if we can

accelerate this unrest. Hasn't happened yet. Maybe after the guns don't go silent, but become a little more sustainable over time, there could be an uprising. I don't see that happening in the near term. >> Well, I'd like to go back to another conflict I know you're familiar with, which is the Balkans, right? Because as we look at Iran, I would not describe it as an ethnically homogeneous like country once you move outside of call it the center of power. And so as I look at the country and I ask where would the fissurers appear? Where would the cracks appear? I think as Chris brought up, not just the Kurds but the Azerbaijanis might have something to say about this as well because you know now that

they've been weakened and the balance of power in the region is potentially shifting. This is when other people see opportunity and sometimes make their moves right? >> Do you see a potential endgame that looks a little bit more like the dissolution of Yugoslavia where Iran may no longer be the exact same geographic footprint and we have some breakaways? >> No. Okay. The short short answer um the longer discussion on all of that is um I don't see Chris Chris mentioned the Kurds. I don't see the Kurds um having a significant role. Uh number one, I don't know that the CIA is in fact going to follow through with this operation. And how we found out about it

uh pisses me off as a guy who grew up in the intel world. Routine leaks like that are un and un you know it it is something that needs to be addressed. Okay, that's a long-term issue. So we we've understood or at least we think there might be some type of an arming of the Kurds as they migrate across. That's what I would describe in military terms as an economy of force. It is not going to significantly alter the dynamics in Thran. And as this new regime kind of tries to uh coalesce and come together and as you've described it is not homogeneous in Iran nor within the leadership. There are a whole bunch of fissures within there. So the Kurdish operation, if it occurs, if it occurs,

is simply a it's going to a a distraction that must be addressed. So it pulls attention, it pulls forces, it pulls resources away. Um the challenge legitimately in Iran is it could it um dissolve into what you described so accurately in the Balkans? I I really don't think so. I think that level of um the differences among them have either been reconciled or have been tolerated over the course of years. In the Balkans, this was millennia old hatred that emerged and simply erupted because it could um and and there was no there were no there were no boundaries that

have been put around it. What we see in the in the Middle East certainly is you have a new hedgemen. It's without doubt it's Israel. So you've got a new hedgeman >> that's not going that hedgeimon is going to routinely be involved in what Iran 2.0 or whatever the heck it is looks like. >> Is Saudi not a rising hedgeimon? Sorry. Go ahead. >> Go ahead to ask a question. >> Is is Saudi not a rising hedgeimon? >> Yes. Regionally is yes. But Israel is the re what I would call the regional hedgemen.