From Failure to Framework: Rebuilding DAOs

Transcript

[Music] um yeah I'm executive director at filecoin incentive design Labs uh I've been in this space that's second sentence uh since 2014 in the space meaning crypto uh and in file coin since uh January this year but I've spent a lot of time thinking about governance and I was heading the um web 3 engagement endow a strategy at consensus for two years and establishing the whole web three and program within consensus because believe it or not they didn't have one before Claus hello hello yes I'm Claus founder of hack humanity

and creator of gov hacks so gov hacks have run twice this year for the arbitrum Dow it's a decentralized governance hackathon where people ship proposals not code uh we get all the relevant stakeholders together to accelerate that proposal uh creation process and I've got lots of stories that I can share about that thanks hi um my name is tesi uh co-founder and uh head of uh network operations at tan um tan started as a as a BC two years ago but we span out the operation entity to focus on the governance operations and also validator

uh business um yeah I'm coming from uh tech industry uh being software engineer and product manager but uh now got fooked into crypto and uh doing D governance you uh I'm vaugh McKenzie landel I'm one of the co-founders of butter we're working on alternative governance mechanisms uh for for protocols we've um I gave a talk earlier on about um we're working on which is uh like a derivative of futak um and um yeah I mean I've been in crypto for an incredibly long time well uh but this way I was like I stumbled into the Bitcoin forums in like 2008 um and I've just been in the space since

then so it's been a long time and uh yeah we're really excited about what we're doing and what's happening at the moment around prediction markets and feels like crypto is going to have a moment so I'm impressed that you don't have any gray hair with that long being in Bitcoin um okay well let's start I like to start start with uh setting a common ground and definitions because uh I've observed that in this space as in most spaces probably uh people mean different things through when they say similar words uh so a question to all of you really what is uh good governance um I think good governance is fit for purpose um and that's different

in in different domains uh to govern is to the emology of the word is to set Direction and to steer right so you know depending on what that domain is um what the mission of your doubt is uh give good governance is effective at know fulfillment of uh the mission I think there are many perspectives to Define good uh but one of the key thing is uh governance need to decide something so the decision process like par ipation of the Voting is definitely the key to uh think about good governance um yeah that's my take I'm going to give a stupid answer

because it's more fun uh so I think I think like a rock is governed like a rock is governed a house is governed humans are governed like we're governed by all kinds of rules so I like to think about governance as just a set of rules and for example we could live in a world of complete Anarchy which is like an ungoverned world where we just self-govern which means we set our own rules and that would be terrifying because you can't expect the potential actions of everybody else to be things that don't necessarily harm you so we kind of take some of the the we take the rules and we Implement them so that it restricts the things we can do so that everybody else's actions are things that maybe can't harm us and that's I think what governance is supposed to do it's

supposed to create sufficient rules such that you can maximize your own welfare so the risk of someone potentially harming you is so bad that we're willing to create some extra external governance system to limit the like potential risk to ourselves and as soon as that's done we find that we can like maximize our welfare this was like one of the best things we ever like came up with was this like system of governance which we're now currently like destroying and it has all these other potential risks but but still like we have this like system of governance and we kind of seed some power to it so that kind of governs us and when we talk about web 3 uh and I want to I want to avoid just asking purely about DS but generally web 3 what

are some of really good governance systems that you're like that's it like that that I think is well-designed governance system or it can be out okay let's say in the world in general I'm going to make it slightly easier I can talk from I'm from New Zealand I can talk about an indigenous perspective so in uh Mai culture and um you have what's called a hooie where everybody comes together to deliberate and do governance and make decision and um you have certain members of the tribe who are known as kiaki they are uh speakers for the non-human world and so they will come and speak and and give the weight a voice of you know how the river doing how's the forest doing oh

that went very loud uh and um so they will speak and that will have a weight in your governance process right and um they've done that for for thousands of years um um and have quite a successful relationship in New Zealand we were the first country to give legal personhood to a river to a river so you know this River uh if you know people abuse the river um has standing in the legal system um and can have representation of humans that you know fight back against uh people who transgress its rights yeah that's awesome oh my God I want to ask more but I want to also give you a chance to to answer well I don't I don't have that kind of a good example but um

um I think as I said like boarding participation is a key for the good governance uh there has been uh popular D that um kind of struggle to get uh boarding like boarding alac is the uh issue for many doubts um I think in the past perspective uh arbitr has been doing very good job to align delegates uh to voting on proposals that like many many proposals many discussions happening um I I think it's it's not just a uh metric

or the measurement to to set on on but uh I think yeah seeing abrum is kind of uh directionally uh good for for us to think about what's the uh what's the what's the good governance or the D is that is trying to achieve something there well have you created in butter some perfect govern perfect governance at the moment it's so small that like it's just I just make the decisions which is I think it's a pretty good um system for small organizations right because you have so much uncertainty and you need to have someone who has the

right incentives to try and cut through that uncertainty um and I have pretty good incentives to try and figure out what we need to work on like what Partnerships we need to enter into when we need to raise money um and I think if I was to try and give that to loads of different people at the beginning it'd be very unlikely that it gets done and obviously I think many many groups have tried to just like start from day one as a decentralized organization that tends to fail um or it's just really hard to do um uh to to kind of the bad the kind of good governance good examples of governance I I don't know if I've seen like really good examples of governance um except for like like the rules of physics like physics governs things pretty well like I think everything else is like has some

flaw but one of the um one of the like I guess like okay govern things is like the governance of markets like Market based governance like there's this idea that um if for example you're inside a company and you're doing something that's bad right eventually the market will just like punish you um and I think that the markets aren't great for everything but they do have this like really nice set of incentives where everybody gets pretty much the same incentives like you can make money in markets you can if you are able to deliver something to the market that's valuable and if you aren't then you do not right um the problem is that not every single individual who participates in markets has access to the same set of resources even the natural resources

that we're like born with right um so I I think that's where it fails but ultimately I think markets are pretty pretty good interesting so what from what you've said you all three said I would say that um communication is something that you definitely identified as a characteristic of good governance the ability to dispute and come to conclusions and and kind of agree upon things um you mentioned AR bitam you mentioned the IND indous gosh um and uh then you mentioned incen um and I would say OB not repeatable rules or objective repeatable rules is something that I I guess you're right

actually if we could apply Market or physics rules into governance maybe not directly but say that it is something that always happens the same way uh or given the same circumstances the outcomes are predictable that makes for a very good governance um what are some examples of terrible governance that you've seen do you have any failures that you love um not a specific failure but I want to uh name a disappointment in um you know coming spending almost an a year with Ds um I think we're reimporting a lot of like worst human behaviors uh into these new structures and I want to

name one example like of a anti pattern that I I witness and um this was a a pattern in groups and Dynamics and an elder gave me but you know imagine a group of people or an a dow a set of delegates and service providers and um there's something called The coward's Bargain so a coward's bargain is you know each of these different people um they will see what another person is proposing or offering but I won't prod you too hard and challenge you too hard about what you're doing because I'm going to need you uh next month for what I'm doing and so we get this Dynamic where people are kind of orbiting around the truth we don't have a truth seeking machine um and there's there's many

other of these kind of anti patterns that I've been starting to observe and and looking at you know do we need to evolve uh and how do we do that the developmental trajectory of like humans um and uh there's many models for that um and what can we design out through structure and process um that actually encourage uh virtuous actions versus non- virtuous actions in the system yeah um in the crypto World we've been uh involved in the cosmos uh ecosystem governance so the cosmos uh ecosystem they have uh validators running running the nose to

run the chain right like e the same for other blockchain project but they have uh they have a delegation from the token hold and validators are going to the one going to be the ones to uh vote on the proposals as well but um as you can imagine validators are great at like system like running nodes but not necessarily to make a make decisions like being delate uh so the incentive arment or the the structure of the governance like rule setting

isn't ideal so their uh decision making the proposals uh are I don't think it's it's working very well so that uh kmos have has many kind of uh controversial proposals that hasn't passed so that they are not like make like moving forward um I think that's one of the um anti-pattern uh governance system that we we should avoid having um there hasn't been like active discussion about how to address the cosmos uh governance system uh which

is concerning uh but uh we are we are definitely interested in kind of trying to do something about it why do you think is that why is there no discussion is it that the rest of the community is happy with the consensus I don't know I I I have a concerns uh some people have concerns but that's also like system systemically failure systemically failed to create the system from the far sprace and then from there like body data is not incentivized to make changes to the system so they they cannot kind of get away

from it so there should be some Innovative chain that utilizing Cosmos SDK to introduce the governance system into it and maybe the other chains we will follow how the governance works but uh I think it takes time um they are not uh yeah they are not incentivized to do that that's definitely the issue incentives that's why I'm going to keep saying incentives um uh examples of bad governance I think that we have some just in like the standard token voting obviously I'm going to keep saying this

but like token voting has some of these like trappings and you've heard this before I won't just give the same talk I just gave I'll say something different um but an example is um uh we got well there's there's a proposal which often gets put through governance which is um hey we have a problem because the delegates and the people who've been given voting power never turn up which means that we have a risk because we have a risk we won't actually be able to meet Quorum in order to pass any proposals right so okay it sounds great lower Quorum okay but we can't lower Quorum because if we lower Quorum then obviously it means anybody could come in and pass a proposal so the solution is we have this huge treasury full of tokens will will we will basically pass a vote to delegate from the treasury to

people who have less token power uh or token voting power great seems like a great solution but isn't that completely backwards right so so remember who controls the treasury the delegates yeah technically the delegates are delegating to themselves so one of the things that keeps delegates like in check right means they don't do crazy stuff is being able to remove their governance power how do you remove the governance power from a delegate who's delegating to themselves they've kind of broken the governance right I think token voting it has like it's a it's a really good generalized mechanism for just like getting signal from people but it has these kind of like Corner cases where it just kind of breaks and I think that's the interesting thing about that is like that's what we've deployed as like a

generalized system for making decisions in crypto so um I don't think you have to go that far to find like systems that are broken in crypto yeah I think well token voting has the the basic problem for me uh with token voting was that always that we are mixing the financial incentive I I want to hold that token and then sell it when it's high because I want to get rich with I really want to have impact on this project and so I'll go I'll hold this token in order to be able to uh to participate and so there are two things about that first as as a caring person I I have to kind of choose what do I do and that's just never okay

uh but the other part of it is that there is this huge number of people that bought a bit of that to because they were hoping that it will rocket Skyrocket and now they have the voting power and we expect when we say there are two million token holders and two million potential voters and only like 1% shows up yeah because that 1% care holds the token and cares about the governance everybody else quite rightly are just wanting to you know waiting for the token to to Skyrocket and and sell it so I always had this problem of thinking about govern token governance as like it's it doesn't really it doesn't really work because we always

talk about vot voter apathy no these are just rational actors that are not interested in voting and we just gave them power to vote it's like we gave them something that they they didn't want um yeah and what you mentioned um Claus about the like bad human behaviors it's been a while now it's probably like two years but we had that a situation where when we were establishing consensus participating in voting and different um projects because they hold quite a bit of token and they wanted to actually execute that power that voting power uh we voted we decided to vote against the stronger Community participants uh in a

vote I'm not going to give the details uh but basically we went against uh some of the bigger Community participants what happened next was that uh my team that was executing that vote have been receiving calls like in the middle of the night uh requesting from the investors to in consensus to change that vote because they do not agree with that decision and how can we like be doing this and going against the community and so on and so forth it was basically like house of cards I literally felt like I'm in some kind of a weird system and we're like yeah this is all decentralized this is all like Anonymous and all that stuff it really there was so much pressure put

on us and we stood our ground and actually we turned out to make the right decision and it's a great story about how we were smart but it was very unpleasant at the time it shouldn't be happening but yeah somehow it is any other horror horror stories not a horror story but yeah I want to share a perspective of like where I'm coming from with Dallas um for me the promise with Ds I see is uh this design and experimentation space to create uh 21st century institutions of power right I think if we look around at the world and look at our current state of Institutions trust is at an alltime

low um just recently we've had the elections and um you know we shouldn't be reliant on Elon Musk as a benevolent dictator to allow us to have freedom of speech we need to be thinking about you know what are our platforms what are our tools how they govern so that critical infrastructure uh is you know managed properly and so you know that's a place that I'm coming from when I'm participating in Dows like how are we going to create uh these kind of structures for critical infrastructure that's fair efficient effective um yeah that's where I'm coming from yeah um well so this year's Nobel Prize uh actually went to three economic Noble price went to three scientists

researching uh the um what imp impact success and failures of Nations uh and they differentiated between inclusive and extractive institutions where the inclusive institution promote broad participation in uh economic economic and political activities uh and protect proper property rights and uphold the rule rule of law through which they Foster Innovation and uh economic growth on the other hand uh the extractive institutions concentrate power and wealth and you know what I'm going to say next right it kind of rings the belt that's why we have Dows like it turns out that these Nobel Prize winners discovered that DS are a great structure

to for Nations to Foster in a way um do you have any other kind of historic you mentioned actually the the stuff that was like the history of New Zealand are there any other ways that we could learn from the history of governance uh in building the centralized governance some best practices and I'm like not asking all of you to answer if you have something to say go for it a little B okay for it I can I can actually just talk a bit more about the the paper um

because I thought it was really really interesting um so there two two guys one of them is called like Darren Asim I can't remember his last name anyway they they have this idea of like why Nations fail and they say that you that what tends to happen is you set up extractive inst if you set up extractive political institutions you will only forever create extractive Economic Institutions um and um I think like if you're a scammer and you set up a DA the da will be will probably scam people right it's not that difficult to understand um but I think as you mentioned it's the properties of those in of the actual institution they set up that are important one of the things I thought was really interesting they talk about

in this paper is uh I say paper there's a book basically um is that you have to have like one of the precursors to having successful political organizations is the abject centralization of power so even though they do talk about things that are important in terms of inclusivity of opinion which is actually why we have I think someone asked earlier like why we have token voting it's because it Aggregates people's preferences and so you can make sure that at least a DA isn't like assaulting anybody's preferences but if you have like um these like uh systems or institutions that are like very inclusive in terms of who they represent one of the first things you need to do is be able to centralize power because no one should be able to stop the person implementing the rules the institution needs to run

and you need like power for that which is really interesting so the thing at the heart of the success of like Nations that are really successful is they've centralized power and actually if you go to some of these like places that they say have failed like some of the more developing nations it's that they haven't successfully centralized power so it means there's competitions for power and there's this really interesting idea I don't think it comes from this person but there's a there's an economic historian called Adam TW and he says there's actually a there's actually a way you can start a country like we could all get together and start a country today and he said the first thing you need to do is get weapons right and you need to seize something right something you need to say this is mine like land or like oil or something

and say this is mine and no one can take it from me and you need to be able to back that up that's the centralization of power right this is my thing and then you need to get someone else to lend to you using that thing as collateral and the moment they do that as a sovereign they recognize you as a sovereign and so basically we have all these big Nations but at the bottom there are all these like groups that are struggling to try to build power in order to do this and I think there's something to learn there about like Dows and a Dows that are successful is that they they govern something valuable the Constitution da was built on the idea that we were going to take over this thing that's really valuable and the moment that went the whole thing fell apart right and so like

this is why I think Dows are really hard to build and I'm really bullish like protocol Dows and I'm really like bearish like other types of dows I think they they tend to have this problem where they can't they have nothing that's sustaining them because there's no like central part that the thing that we've done in crypto is we've said you can have some centralization so for example ethereum is logically centralized it's centralized protocol but it's like architecturally distributed and so I think that that's the idea with Dows they're going to be like logically decentralized they have some core intelligence some core model some Core Power set but then you're you're Distributing that power across people but you still have to have the like centralizing part I don't know how that helps you build Dows but that's my [Laughter] observation uh and of course if you guys

have any questions I I really love having interactive panels so like if you disagree very strongly with something or agree just raise your hand we don't have to be like the four people in the front in front of you just boring you to death okay I'll go next um so one of the things that definitely like is a corner or or or or one of the core principles of web 3 is transparency but it's actually not given in in Dow well we already mentioned it I mentioned the stuff that was happening in in the vote that we were executing and there are many more examples like that where actually the transparency isn't really transparent it's kind of transparent in paper but then there's all this stuff

that is happening in the background um do you have any kind of observations or stories around how very good transparency or maybe lack of transparency has impacted the community and either made it bloom or quite the opposite completely destroyed it I think the this is a this is a tricky one um so most of the Dows uh exist in this tripartite relationship with the lab and the foundation right and um the Dow is very transparent most

of the time but within the foundation or within the labs um they are not too much uh and they need to um maintain that because they're in competition with say other foundations or other labs um and there would be uh disadvantage to be transparent in those kind of cases um yeah we've most recently seen that with uh with Unis swap between um uni swap uh the uni chain and the Dow um I think this is a tricky one I don't think we have the answers for how this needs to work I think sometimes transparency is helpful and sometimes it's uh unhelpful yeah I think those who are going to be

affected by something uh have a view of it coming and ability to uh participate in the influence of uh that choice yeah yeah yeah he he mentioned that uniso and un uni chain case but uh I we've been involved in the optimism governance um optimism is hisory ically kind of centralized in a way in terms of like making decision reactions uh compared to arum I think um there has been also challenges that uh like op Labs making decision about what to what to make they

they' been developing softwares um but that has to be like competitive in a way uh like like un chain right like um they have to they have to make plans they have to make software that works um which hasn't been communicated to Da uh clearly um and there has been some concerns from the delegate side that how how do we kind of align what we are trying to do like from my experience in the grand Council uh as thinka said like gr grants program in the middle like

it's uh somewhat decentralized in a way like operational operational perspective but also like setting up like RF like request for program kind of things it's more uh involved in like making direction of what to what to uh request uh applicants to make applications to make impact to the protol um so Grand Council perspective we like to know what what change what protocol change is going to happen which isn't clearly communicated from the laes um all the foundations who supposed to kind of make the bridge between um da and the laes uh

I think uh the foundation and the laes are trying to address this issue uh going forward but as as K said uh there should be some Balan between which kind of information is disclosed when um and how much right so um yeah transparency is definitely uh kind of spectrum of uh how we how how we approach uh and uh yeah it's not like a black and white kind of things like it's transparent or not I was just going to say I think the

idea of a completely transparent organization is like impossible right I think that humans keep secrets and it's like a strength it's not like a it's not fa actually has anybody read the three bodybody problem yeah so I'm going to ruin it for a lot of you that um uh what um humans have to like compete against this other like alien race and the alien race can't lie and that's like our skill that's the that's how we beat the aliens um so I think that like organizations as you said because they're comp they're competitive and competition is really valuable because it forces people to direct their resources to the to the the few activities and the like raw ingredients and production processes that are going to produce as much um

value as possible if you think about uni chain uni swap having like the whole of unisoft knowing about uni chain the entire time that could have been a problem right and so you can see why there's some value to keeping secrets and having private information and I think actually the way you resolve this is you just say that Unis swop Dow is not the Dow right Unis swap plus sorry Unis swap Labs plus Unis swap Foundation plus Unis swap token holders like the what we call the Dow today plus all the service providers that orbit that protocol that's the Dow so the da actually cannot like the Dow can't keep secrets because it knows it just knows in one part of the like constellation of ORS and so it's fine there were no it was very transparent but it was just selectively transparent to the people

who needed to know that's how I that's how I escape the the Trap transparent select when needed selective yeah disclosure that's that's an interesting idea does governance actually need to be decentralized wouldn't we benefit from saying we decentralize development we decentralize conversations and kind of let ideas flourish but then we have you know Linux linnus torval being the benevolent dictator making the decisions while while the community can just have the input I don't think you ever want to talk about governance in absence of the governed so what are we governing and then I think you decide whether your

governance needs to be decentralized and again governance being decentralized what does that mean does it mean the the rules are decentralized like the implementation of the rules is decentralized does it mean the rul makers are decentralized doesn't mean like the the rule en forces are are decentralized and I think that you in for blockchain protocols the reason why you would want some form of decentralized governance is to guarantee the kind of credible neutrality and the capture resistance of the protocol for example you have a solo developer he writes some code he deploys it on chain it's some kind of def5 protocol you throw your tokens in there woohoo let's go to the Moon all of a sudden you get rug pulled right and that's because there's a solo developer who's able to

unilaterally change the protocol right you can just move the tokens out and so you want to have some system that guarantees that if someone wants to make a change you have like literally have an ability to stop them right and I always say like a good way of thinking about governance is just like your ability to limit the harm that could be done to yourself that's why I think you need dear in like decentralized protocols but you definitely do not leave decentralized governance all the time hence what I'm calling the da the new DA I call them I call them autonoma like the new DA this big structure you have a lab structure in there that is the that is completely centralized it has a centralized corporate governance you have a foundation similar right maybe it's a not for profit and and that's fine I think that's totally fine so it's

it's it's more about like the are you laughing it's very special definition of d I think it's my it's a it's my new definition I don't think it's actually it's not real yet but you know maybe give us like the next governance day we be talking about autona and da all right that's it's not going to happen but hopefully maybe we just take we just like take over the da word and that becomes a new da um yeah well let's let's actually talk a little bit about uh about that um initially when thinking of like evolution of dows right I I strongly believe that Dows are just like one step in decentralized governance or web blockchain governance like I think that

for a split of a second we thought like that was the end goal and we will all be just governed by Dallas like 2021 definitely felt and 22 like everybody was just building a DA uh I think now we are seeing this as like experimentation around what can be done with governance and I think in intern in initially when vitalic published the paper in 2014 um on decentralized Aon decentralized uh it wasn't autonomous organizations it was something else anyway um the he he talked about like this organization being organizations being governed by smart contracts and it was like basically like this weird

machine Mach that will just run itself and felt almost like something from sci-fi and now we're like well yeah but who writes smart contracts who votes on Smart contracts it's humans right so there's a very strong human aspect to uh to the Dow and my question to you is how those interpersonal Dynamics impact governance and how do we manage those inter interpersonal uh Dynamics to get the project to the best best place it can be yeah this is a tricky one apparently all my questions there tricky I mean we got yeah humans are going to human right in these kind of

spaces um I like to uh tell the story in uh contradistinction to uh I did two years with uh IBM which is a 400,000 uh person very centralized uh organization you've got you know processes and procedures for everything from performance reviews to you know someone that can help you with your mental health to uh everything you can think of right and then we ask people to come and participate in a dow and none of that kind of scaffolding is there it's just like jump um write a proposal uh jump on a council get going um and then you have a bunch of humans at varing levels of um alignment uh trying to work together or or compete with each other um I think

we're yeah we're missing some of the um like the glue that can actually help uh humans to step into these like self-organizing structures um particularly you know most of us have grown up uh in a family in a school maybe working in a job um where you can look around for somebody to tell you what to do or give you Direction and when you come to a dow it's permissionless and you've got to you know work out what the heck you have to do and that um can be a huge burden a huge amount of uh cost uh time uh and not knowing um and I think that cost uh isn't fair in the way that it's structured I think a lot of DS um they run at least the start on the promise and uh Goodwill of a lot of people

putting in a lot of free Labor uh and I don't think it's right and I think we need to uh compensate for work that's work um and also think about the human development side of the Dow so um there's something called a deliberately developmental organization it's a guy Robert Keegan who wrote the book and he's the foremost expert on stages of adult development and we need to think about you know the humans in the loop how do we actually help them uh mature uh to work with each other and things which are deterministic like rules spased processes we you know automate those and progressively um we have this cybernetic organism of humans good at what humans do um and then progressively like automate out the

parts I think the A and the Dow the automation is massively underexplored at the moment and that needs to ramp up um I'm talking from more practical like perspective um so all the discussions uh happening online so that and then the kind of nature of the crypto you don't really see the face of the people who got involved in the Dow um which which is good good or bad I think uh but I felt that when I participated in the go HCK uh organized

by K and the team um very beneficial for for for us to meet uh actual people uh who get involved in the governance um in person and from there I think we communicate better even even on like after that online and uh how how we can kind of move forward with the with the governance in a better better way um yeah in that perspective I like to thank uh crafts in the team and I I i' like to get your opinions on

um how how how you think about like organizing the like offline event and what's uh what kind kind of like human uh perspectives that are beneficial for the D governance okay um yeah for those who AR aware I ran this uh event called gov Haack I've run it twice as a 3-day IRL event for arbitrum down at e Denver and EC and my formative statement that guided this work was progress moves at the speed of trust and so you know there's only one level of trust building and and one level of uh progress that we can do when

we have a bunch of people who have never met each other or have sporadic interactions uh online and so wanted to create this space uh where we could bring you know people from lots of this multi-stakeholder perspective from the foundation the labs uh contributors the kind of Old Guard who've been around a while brand newbies uh delegates and get everybody in the mix together and start to build that trust and understanding of each uh role and and all of your counterparts um and Beyond creating that connection um so hack humanity is the business that hosted this it's based on four principles connected creative powerful and alive so we get people connected and once we' start to get connected then we get creative and we broke people out

looking at the you know the top priorities uh in the Dow and starting to get creative to co-design and build uh proposals like right there and then on the spot um and basically iterate on that people start to get present to uh the power of we can actually shortcut what normally takes three months and get that done in three days so for instance some of the proposals uh that came out of govhack um number one we had um the establishment of an m&a unit for arbitrum Dal the first you know Dow to do that uh a ventures unit so that the uh the Dow can do Equity investment um we had the um treasury diversification program um we had you know rwas as a new C category that didn't exist before um

we had a um a deel university so we're basically yeah a lady came who wanted to train 60 new devels in arbitrum Tech and then she won the money to do that and she's now progressing that so you know very different kind of outcomes to a typical hackathon um where you're shipping code yeah any last thoughts I was told that we have to finish up talked to you like for hours I just wanted to summarize if that's okay yeah thank you um do you want any no I okay so I think you know the the title was from failure to framework rebuilding Dows I don't think that we actually came up with the framework but definitely things that I heard from you are focused a lot around

the human um aspect of things and kind of moving almost from thinking about just code and protocol to thinking about political science or social studies and psychology and how we do we deal with the humans in the loop about the communication uh and then also just using the beauty of physics and uh Market to understand that uh having C clear rules makes for much better systems than uh arbitrary rules um so that's my summary uh that's what I learned from you all thank you so much for your time and thank you for participating thank you you